Jenny

Privacy

Every outbound connection Jenny can make

Not "we promise not to look" — there is nowhere for us to look from. No account, no sign-up, no telemetry, no analytics SDK, no crash reporter, no server of ours. The claim is checkable in the code, and so is the one automatic request: a daily look at GitHub for a new version.

  1. Your configured LLM provider. Messages, session history, tool results, and any workspace file the agent reads — plus your last-known location, on every turn, if location sharing and the Android permission are both on.
  2. Bing. Your web_search queries, only when the agent actually calls the tool. The engine is fixed to Bing — there's no picker.
  3. Sites reached by web_fetch / download_file. Whatever a normal visit reveals: a real, hidden WebView with the phone's own IP, user-agent and cookies.
  4. api.telegram.org. Only if you paired a bot. Off by default. Your conversation transits Telegram's servers under Telegram's terms.
  5. GitHub Releases. Once a day, a plain request for the latest version's manifest: no identifier, nothing about you. It has its own switch.
  6. The SSH hosts you registered. The commands the agent runs there, and the files it uploads. Off by default, and only for machines you added yourself.
  7. Your Google Drive — Play Store build only. An encrypted copy of the workspace, if you turn it on, readable only with a password you choose and nobody stores. The GitHub build has no code for it.

The caveat we won't hide

Your provider API keys sit in config.json in plain text, protected by Android's app sandbox and nothing else. And anything in Jenny's workspace that the agent reads can end up in the context sent to your provider: there is no private corner inside it. Android's own cloud backup takes nothing from Jenny; to move to a new phone, use her encrypted backup or the phone-to-phone transfer.

Full privacy model, with every gating condition → · Security model →