Privacy

There is no Jenny backend and no telemetry: everything Jenny sends off the device is a direct, traceable consequence of something you asked it to do, going to a service you configured.

No telemetry, no Jenny-operated backend

Jenny does not phone home. There is no analytics SDK, no crash reporter, and no Jenny-operated server anywhere in the stack — the codebase has been checked for common telemetry/crash-reporting libraries (Firebase, Crashlytics, Sentry, generic “analytics” SDKs) and none are present. The one thing in the code that uses the word “telemetry” internally is the token-usage counter, and that counter is purely local bookkeeping (visible in Settings → System → Token usage): it is never transmitted anywhere.

The WebUI itself is served entirely from 127.0.0.1 — no page, font, or script it loads comes from the internet.

The four data recipients

Data only leaves the phone through one of these four paths, each gated by a condition you control.

Recipient	What it receives	Condition
Your configured LLM provider	Chat messages, session history, tool results, and the content of any file the agent reads from the workspace. Also your device’s last-known location, on every single turn, if location sharing is on and the Android permission is granted — not only when you explicitly ask “where am I”.	Always, for any turn — this is the provider you added in onboarding/Settings. Location is additionally gated by tools.location.enable (default true) and the Android location permission.
Bing	Your web_search queries.	Only when the agent actually calls web_search (tools.androidWeb.search.enable, default true). The search engine is currently fixed to Bing — there’s no picker.
Sites visited by web_fetch / download_file	Whatever a normal browser visit to that site would reveal: the site sees the request coming from a real, hidden Android WebView, with the phone’s own IP address, user-agent, and WebView cookies — not an anonymized fetch.	Only when the agent calls web_fetch or download_file on a URL.
api.telegram.org	Messages, if you’ve paired a Telegram bot: your conversation transits Telegram’s servers under Telegram’s terms, not Jenny’s.	Only if telegram.enabled is true (default false — off until you explicitly connect a bot).

A fifth, smaller case: if your configured provider is OpenRouter, Jenny adds fixed attribution headers to every request (HTTP-Referer pointing at Jenny’s GitHub repo, X-OpenRouter-Title: Jenny) so OpenRouter can attribute traffic to the app. This doesn’t add a new recipient — OpenRouter is already your chosen LLM provider — but it does add identifying metadata to that traffic.

What stays local

Everything else lives in the app’s private storage (<filesDir>/workspace and nearby), inaccessible to other apps and never transmitted:

• config.json — including provider API keys, stored in plaintext (see the caveat below).
• Chat history and consolidated long-term memory (memory/history.jsonl, MEMORY.md, USER.md).
• Uploaded attachments (workspace/uploads/) and agent downloads (workspace/downloads/).
• Media (images, previews) and wiki content.
• Workspace snapshots (the local “time machine” backups — see Backup and restore).
• Token usage counts.

The allowBackup exception

Android’s manifest declares android:allowBackup="true" with no exclusion rules. In practice this means Google’s automatic cloud backup for this app can include app data — potentially config.json, with your provider API keys in plaintext, and your chat history — as part of a normal Android device backup to Google’s servers. This is the one real exception to “everything stays local”: it’s not something Jenny does deliberately, it’s a consequence of a manifest flag not yet paired with backup exclusion rules.

Until this is tightened, if you care about your API keys not potentially ending up in a Google Account backup, check your device’s backup settings for this app, or disable Android’s app data backup for Jenny specifically.

The workspace-to-provider chain

It’s worth stating this relationship plainly, because it’s easy to underestimate: any file placed inside the workspace is readable by the agent, and anything the agent reads can end up in the context sent to your LLM provider. There’s no separate “private files” area inside the workspace — the workspace boundary (see Security model) controls what the agent can reach on disk, not what it’s willing to send upstream once it has read something. If you drop a sensitive document into workspace/, expect that its content can travel to whichever provider you’ve configured, the moment the agent has a reason to read it.

How to shrink the surface

None of the four recipients above are mandatory except your LLM provider (Jenny can’t function without one). To reduce what leaves the device:

• Turn off location sharing in Settings if you don’t want your last-known location included in every turn sent to the provider.
• Don’t enable Telegram unless you actually want a second channel — it’s off by default, and enabling it means your conversation also flows through Telegram’s servers.
• Pick your LLM provider deliberately. Since messages, history, and file contents all go to whichever provider you configure, your provider’s own privacy policy and data-retention practice matters as much as anything Jenny does.
• Avoid putting anything you wouldn’t want reaching your LLM provider inside workspace/, given the chain described above.

Related pages

• Security model — the containment layers and the honest can/cannot lists.
• Location — the location toggle and Android permission.
• Telegram bridge — what Telegram adds and when it’s active.
• Configuration reference — tools.location, telegram.enabled, and related keys.